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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEGRANDE Le BELNAP 
Appellant 
VSo Case No. 18649 
WALKER BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, in its corporate 
capacity 
Respondents 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order of the Honorable 
Bryant Ho Croft, denying the plaintiff judgment upon his com-
plaint against the defendant seeking to quiet title to pro-
perties situated in Salt Lake County; and from the same 
Order granting the defendant declaratory relief, pursuant 
with the prayer of defendant's counterclaim, declaring that 
the defendant had a good and valid mortgage against the pro-
perty which is the subject of this action. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Bryant H. Croft, entered his order 
denying the relief sought by the plaintiff in his case in 
chief, which action was brought for the purpose of quieting 
title to the subject property in the plaintiff and declaring 
that the defendant had no interest in the same., At the 
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same time, the Honorable Judge Croft granted defendant's 
motion for Summary Judgment on its counterclaim for dec-
laratory relief, which judgment effectively disposed of 
the issues raised in plaintiff's complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff contends that the District Court erred 
in denying him the relief sought and in granting the 
defendant declaratory relief. The plaintiff seeks an Order 
of this Court reversing the judgment of the District Court, 
since the same is based upon a complaint for declaratory 
relief ,_.,hich does not comply with statute; and for a further 
order of this Court remanding this case to the District 
Court with the direction that the District Court enter 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant 
for the reason that defendants claim to a lien interest in 
real property is based upon a written instrument which is 
void; or failing the aforementioned relief, for an order 
directing that the judgment be reversed and the case sent 
back for trial of all issues raised by plaintiff's complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The plaintiff's father and mother deeded real 
property to the plaintiff by Warranty Deed dated August, 1951, 
( Suppl.emen tal Record pp. 1) . 
2e Said real property was situated in Salt Lake 
County and located at 1466 Indian Hills Drive, (Supplemental 
record pp. ·l) c 
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3. Plaintiff and plaintiff's wife erected a 
home on said property and had resided there continuously 
until the death of plaintiff's wife in 1972; and plaintiff 
has continued to reside in said property since hPr death 
(Deposition of LeGrande Le Belnap, Record pp 0 585, (deposition 
page 20) . 
4c The deed conveying said property to the 
plaintiff was delivered to the defendant and made part of 
an application by the plaintiff and plaintiff's wife-for a 
mortgage on th~. subject property. (Affidavit of LeGrande 
L. Belnap, Record PPc 164-165). 
5. Without the knowledge and consent of the 
plaintiff, the defendant took delivery of a second deed of 
the same property proportedly conveyir.g said property ex-
clusively to plaintiff's wife. Said deed dated November 
10, 1952 was forged as to the signature of plaintiff's 
mother and the signature of plaintiff's father is still fact-
ually in dispute. (Affidavit of LeGrande L. Belnap, Record 
pp. 164-165; Deposition of Ben Garcia, Record p. 586; deposition 
page 24, lines 1-10 page 25, lines 1-9, page 26 lines g,_g; 
Affidavit of Wilford W. Kimball, record pp. 80-81; Affidavit 
of Henry Belnap, Record pp. 14-15; Record page 768,deposition 
pp. 6, 9-10; Affidavit of Leslie W. King, transcript pp. 
182-183) 0 
6. The circumstances in the execution and delivery 
of the deed dated November 10, 1952 is in dispute. peposition 
of Henry Belnap, record page 768 deposition pp. 6, 9-10; 
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Affidavit of Henry Belnap, Record pp. 14-15). 
7. The defendant required the plaintiff to 
execute a mortgage with warranties of title that he had 
title to the subject property even though the defendant 
recorded the forged deed concurrent with the recordation of 
said mortgage; and even though the defendant retained the 
original conveyance of August, 
to the plaintiff and his wife. 
Kimball, Record pp. 80-81). 
1951, conveying said property 
(Affidavit of Wilford W. 
8. Both deeds were in the possession and control 
of the defendant at all times prior to the initiation of 
this action, at which time they were deposited with the Clerk 
of the Court. (Deposition of Stephen L. Goalen, Record 
pp. 769 deposition page 9 lines 8-25, page 10 lines 1-10). 
9_ In 1964, without the knowledge of the plaintiff, 
the defendant recorded a trust deed on said property executed 
by plaintiff's wife. (Affidavit of Wilford W. Kimball 
Record pp. 80-81). 
10. Plainitff's wife died in 1972 and a probate 
action was brought to the Third District Court. (Record 
pp. 653-655). 
11. The defendant was appointed the special 
administratior and the administrator of the estate of plaintiff 
wife1 and the defendant has received a final discharge from 
its duties as the administrator of the estate of plaintiff's 
wife. (Record pp. 656-658; Record pp. 712; Record pp 714-715). 
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12° Subsequent to the death of the plaintiff's 
wife, the plaintiff brought this action against the 
defendant, seeking to quiet title to the property, which 
is the subject of ~laintiff 's complainto (Record ppo 2-3) 0 
130 The defendant filed its answer and counter-
claim seeking declaratory relief pursuant with the statutes 
of the State of Utaho (Record ppo 6-9) 0 
140 In its answer and counterclaim, the defendant 
denied that the plaintiff had any interest in the subject 
property; but joined no additional parties claiming any 
interest, and made no allegations of a chain of titleo 
(Record ppo 6-9) o 
lSo In its final order and judgment, the court 
ordered that the plaintiff had no record interest in the 
subject property on which to base a judgment quieting title 
in the name of the plaintiff as against all other parties 
to the action; and that the defendant was entitled to de-
claratory relief determining that the defendant's trust deed was 
a good and valid lien against the subject propertyo 
(Record ppo 550 and 551, and 535)0 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUJ.\'!MARY JUDGMENT BASED UPON A COUNTERCLAIM FOR 
DECLARATORY RELIEF WHERE THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO SET FORTH IN 
THE ALLEGATIONS OF ITS COUNTERCLAIM ANY FACTS SUPPORTING ITS 
CHAIN OF TITLE, AND FURTHER, WHERE THE DEF'ENDANT FAILED TO 
JOIN ANY NECESSARY PARTY IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEFe 
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On April 16, 1973, the defendant filed its Answer 
and Counterclaim in this case. In its answer and counter-
claim, the defendant merely alleged that it was the owner· 
and holder of a trust deed and note on certain property; 
and without anything further, prayed for declaratory judg-
ment., (Record pp. 8) This, in spite of the fact that the 
defendant denied that the plaintiff had any interest in the 
subject property, and further that the defendant joined no 
party whom· it claimed had an inter.=st .. 
The judgment of the lower court granted declaratory 
relief despite these facts. Indeed, the judgment stands for 
the proposition that the defendant is entitled to a "dee-
laration" that it holds a good and valid lien upon real 
property even though no person, firm, or corporation, having 
any claim of interest in the property was ever made a party 
to the action. 
· The applicable statute on Declaratory relief provides 
as follows: 
"When declaratory relief is sought all 
persons shall {emphasis supplied) be 
mad~ parties who have or claim any 
interest which would be affected by the 
declaration .... 11 Utah Code Annotated 
78-33-11. . 
Appellant acknowledges that the declaratory relief 
statute is to be liberally construed., It is respectfully 
submitted, however, that to grant declaratory relief res-
pecting title to real property without joining any party 
who may claim an interest, is not only an abuse of judicial 
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discretion with respect to liberal construction, it is also 
a denial of fundamental rights of due process. Declaratory 
relief is designed to promote judicial economy ~11t to grant 
such relief without an opponent is a total wasteo 
Appellant claimed to be the sole owner of the 
s?bject property. The Court found that appellant had no 
interest. Respondant, on the other hand, denied appellant's 
title yet agreed to allow the court to dismiss out all 
persons who may have claimed any interest (Record ppa 389, 
394-395 para. 2). Later, as will be argued hereafter, 
respondant in its capacity as administrator of the estate of 
appellant's deceased wife, disclaimed any interest in the 
subject propertye 
The second problem with the judgment of the 
District Court granting declaratory relief in favor of the 
respondents and against the appellant is that the pleadings 
of the respondents are fatally defectiveo To obtain 
declaratory relief on a Trust Deed declaring that said Trust 
Deed is a good and valid lien on real property, requires 
that the parties seeking such declaratory relief allege a 
chain of titleo The respondent, in its answer and counter-
claim, and in its amended answer and counterclaim which it 
subsequently withdrew, never alleged any chain of title 
whatsoever. Consequently, there is no allegation in pleadings 
of the respondent whereby the Court could determine that the 
Trust Deed, which respondent sought to have declared valid 
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had any root of title whatsoever. In fact, if we are to 
rely upon the allegations of respondent's answer to plaintiff 1 s 
complaint, the respondent affirmatively alleges that it 
claims no title in the subject property. In this respect, 
appellant quotes from the answer of the respondent as 
follows: 
"In further answer to plaintiff's com-
plaint, this defendant alleges that it 
has and claims no right, title, interest 
or estate in the property descrihAd in 
plaintiff's complaint save and except as 
the owner and holder of a certain tr~st 
deed dated May 3, 1963, ... " (Record, 
pp. 7 Paragraph (4). 
The law of the State of Utah has been established 
in a long line of cases commencing in 1924 and continuing 
through the present date. In the case of Campbell v. 
Union Savings and Investment C~ 63 Utah 366, 226 Pacific 
190 (1924), the court dealt with a factual situation sun-
stantially similar to the case at hand. In that case, the 
defendant, Union Savings and Investment Company had filed an 
answer and counterclaim, and in their answer had specifically 
denied plaintiff's title to the subject property and set up 
by way of counterclaim, a claim that it had a mortgage in-
terest in the subject property. Defendant's pleadings, how-
ever, failed to set forth any claim of ownership or interest 
in the mortgaged premises, and the court stated as follows: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 9 
"In the absence of any claim of owner-
ship or interest by the defendant in the 
mortgaged premises, we cannot conceive 
how the mortgage constituted any lien 
upon the property in question .. " 
Campbell, 226 Pacific 190 at page 193 
In the Campbell case, it should be noted, that 
the defendant, Union-savings and Investment Company had 
set forth in the allegations of its counterclaim that 
it had obtained title from a party through whom the 
plaintiff did not claim titles In the instant case, 
by way of contrast, Walker Bank and Trust Company, the 
respondent ,has failed even :in that respect to allege tr.at 
it even had a mortgagor or truster from whom it could 
obtain a valid lien against the property. (Record pp. 
8 Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of counterclaim). 
The Campbell case was subsequently cited in 
Pender v. Bird, et al., 224 Pacific 2d 1057 (Utah 1950) 
and the principals set forth in the Campbell case reaffirmed., 
The Pender case, however, was distinquished from the CamJ2.t>ell 
case in that the claim of title in the Pender case was 
based upon a chain of title which was defective. In the 
case at hand, as will be shown hereafter, it is clear 
that the deed upon which the respondent would have the 
Court base its title is a forgery, and therefore, void. 
Both the Campbell case and the Pende~ case have been sub-
sequently affirmed and followed by the case of Pleasant 
Grove City vs. Crease, et al., Utah, 266 Pacific 2d 1019 
(1954)., In the Pleasant Grove case, the court stated 
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as follows: 
"In Pender v. Bird, 224 Pacific 2d 1057 
a similar situation was presented. The 
plaintiff claimed title under a deed 
which we held conveyed nothing. The 
defendant, Bird, claimed title under a 
tax title which this court assumed to 
be defective. We held that the defendant 
Bird being in possession under color of 
title was entitled to a decree quieting 
title against the plaintiff who had no 
vestage of title. Reliance was placed 
upon Campbell v. Union Savings & Invest-
ment Co., 63 Utah 366 226 Pacific 190, 
at 193, where this court held that the 
title of plaintiff who was in possession 
however defective it may be, 'is never-
theless ample to withstand the assaults 
of the defendant so long as the defen-
dant shows no right, title, or interest 
whatever in the property' . 11 Pleasant 
Grove City vs. Crease, 266 Pacific 2d 1019, 
at Page 1020. 
POINT II: IS THE RESPONDENT, WALKER BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY-BARRED BY DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA, ESTOPPLE 
BY JUDGMENT OR THE "ONE ACTION RULE" FROM 
ASSERTING AN INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY WHICH THEY 
HAVE PREVIOUSLY DISCLAIMED ANY INTEREST IN, AND 
li-/HERE THE COUNTERCLAIM OF WALKER BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY IN ITS CAPACITY AS THE SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF UTAHNA P. BELNAP IN THIS ACTION HAS 
BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE 
In considering the questions of res judicata, 
estopple by judgment, and the 11 0ne Action Rule", appellant 
feels that it would be helpful to set forth a recitation 
of the facts upon which it claims the respondent is barred 
from obtaining a judgment for declaratory relief in this 
action. 
1. Walker Bank & Trust Company was appointed the 
special administrator of the estate of Utahna Petty Belnap 
on March 19, 1973, (Record pp.565-657). 
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2., Walker Bank & Trust Company was appointed the 
administrator of the estate of Utahna Petty Belnap on 
August 24, 19760 (Record, ppc 712). 
3o As the special administrator~ 
A. Walker Bank & Trust Company petitioned 
the court for authority to pay themselves all past due 
payments due on the Trust Deed note which is the subject 
of the counterclaim of the respondent,·Walker Bank & Trust 
Company in its action for declaratory relief c (Record 
pp 0 6 7 6 - 6 7 8 ) • 
B. In their petition, Walker Bank & Trust 
Company as the special administrator set forth the 
fact that LeGrande Lo Belnap, appellant in this case, 
disputed the claim of the estate that the estate had an 
interest in the property which was given as security for 
the subject trust deed and noteo 
c. On May 15, 1975, the court approved pay-
ments from the estate of Utahna Petty Belnap on the note 
of Walker Bank & Trust Company and directed that all cur-
rent payments be continued to be made by the estate to 
Walker Bank & Trust Company until further order of the 
court. (Record pp. 674-75, 707). 
D. No order was ever entered by the Third 
District Court in either of the probate actions, which 
are part of this appeal terminating the authorization to 
pay the payments on the note from the assets of the estate 
of Utahna Petty Belnap. 
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E. On January 31, 1976, Walker Bank & 
Trust Company as the special administrator filed its 
"SECOND AND FINAL ACCOUNT OF WALKER SANK & TRUST COMPANY 
AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF UTAHNA PETTY 
BELNAP, DECEASED, OCTOSER l, 1974 THROUGH JANUARY 31, 
1976c (Record pp. 693). 
F. On January 31, 1976, Walker Bank & Trust 
Company deleted the trust property from the estate with 
·the statement 11 Court determined above property to be 
that of LeGrande L. Belnap and not that of decedent. 
Per Court order dtd 01/19/76. 11 (Record pp. 700). 
- G. Thereafter, Walker Bank & Trust as the 
administrator of the estate of Utahna P. Belnap continued 
to act as such until it was appointed as the administrator 
in August, 1976. (Record pp. 712) c 
H. Walker Bank & Trust Company as the 
special administrator f~led a counterclaim in this case on 
April 16, 1973. (Record pp. 10-12) c Said counterclaim 
alleged that the estate of Utahna P. Belnap owned the 
fee simple interest in the property which was given as 
security for the trust deed note which is the subject of 
respondent's petition for declaratory relief, and further 
alleged in said counterclaim that LeGrande L. Belnap had 
no interest in the property and sought the aid of the court 
quieting title in the estate as against the interest of 
LeGrande Belnap. Said counterclaim of the special 
administrator in this action, was dismissed with prejudice 
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(Order, Judgment and Decree dated 1 la 
- - .7-76, Record 
PPo 390-91) . 
The respondent, Walker Bank & Trust Company 
claims a lien against the subject property by virtue 
of a Trust Deed and a Trust Deed Note signed by Utahna 
Petty Belnap. The estate of Utahna Belnap, with 
Walker Bank & Trust as the special administrator disclaimed 
any interest in the property, and consented that its 
counterclaim in this action be dismissed with prejudice 
(Record pp. 390-391). The respondent was present at 
the hearing when the estate and others were dismissed, 
and when the counterclaim of the estate was dismissed 
with prejudice. The respondent as a corporation 
never filed a claim against the e:3tate of Utahna Petty 
Belnap even though notice to creditors was duly given 
pursuant with statute. (Record pp. 716-718). 
This court is no doubt aware of the broad use 
(or misuse) of the Doctrines of Estopple. One form of 
estopple which seems to be applicable in the case at 
hand is commonly referred to as judicial estopple. 
It is a general rule that a party is bound by his 
judicial declarations and may not contradict them in 
a subsequent action or proceeding. Tracy Loan and 
Trust Company vs. Openshaw Investment Company, 102 Utah 
509, 132 Pacific 2d 388. In light of the Tracy case 
(op. cit.) it would seem that Walker Bank & Trust Company 
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as the administrator of the estate of Utahna Petty 
Belnap has in fact made judicial declarations by virtue 
of the filing of its second and final account in that 
estate, disclaiming any interest in the subject property, 
and further by reason of the fact that it has voluntarily 
consented to the dismissal of any claim which it may have 
in the estate, which dismissal was granted by this court 
in this case with prejudice. 
Generally speaking, it has been said that estopple 
is a bar which would preclude a person or entity from 
denying anything to the contrary of that which has been 
established as a fact by the acts of a judicial body, or 
which has been established by his own acts or conduct 
or lack thereof. Kessinger Ve Anderson, 31 Washington 
2d, 157, 196 Pacific 2d 289c 
The respondent would have this court believe that 
while it is acting in its corporate capacity (it has 
no other capacity) that it cannot be bound for acts which 
it participat~d in in a judicial forum in some other capacity. 
Appellant respectfully submits that such a distinction is 
clearly witpout forme It is axiomatic that a corporation 
is given its form by virtue of the lawc Since Walker 
Bank & Trust Company does not exist except in a corporate 
form, obviously it cannot function except in its corporate 
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formo Whether it is acting on its own account, or 
whether it is acting on the account of others, it is 
the same capacity and the same "corpus"o Since 
Walker Bank & Trust Company can have only one person-
ality, it is therefore submitted to this court under 
the policy of Tracy Loan & Trust Company (opo cito) 
that the respondent is bound by its own acts in another 
capacity in the same District Court respecting the 
subject property. 
It is often said, however, that in order. to 
enforce the principals of estopple against one party 
in favor of another party, that it rnQst be shown that 
the party seeking to enforce the principal of estopple 
I'!lUSt show that he has been harmedo Since it is clear 
that the estate of Utahna Petty Belnap has now been 
finally settled under the hand of Walker Bank & Trust 
Company as the administrator, and since it is further 
clear that the statutory time for the plaintiff to file 
any claim against the estate of Utahna Petty Belnap which 
he may have by virtue of the claimed lien of Walker Bank 
& Trust Company in this action has runp that the plaintiff 
has clearly been prejudiced and has no other claim or 
claimant against which he could assert a claim in damages 
as a result of the judgment of the District Court in this 
caseo Since Walker Bank & Trust Company was party to the 
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judicial action declaring that the estate of Utahna 
Petty Belnap had no interest in the subject property, 
and since the appellant in this matter is clearly pre-
judiced in that he is not now able to bring any claim 
for damages against the estate of Utahna Petty Belnap 
as a result of the claimed lien of the respondent, the 
Doctrines of Estopple should clearly apply against the 
defendant and in favor of the plaintiff in this case. 
In the case of Wevant vs. Utah Savinas & Trust Co~ 54 
Utah, 181, 182 Pacific 189, 9 ALR, 1119, the Supreme 
Court held that where the statutory notice to creditors 
had been given pursuant with the statutes applicable 
to probate proceedings, all persons who were interested 
in the estate are bound by all orders and decrees duly 
entered in that particular case. Such is the 
case here, and the doctrines of the Wevant 
case would not only apply to the appellant in this case, 
but should also be made to apply to the respondent. 
In addition to the Doctrines of Estopple, the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-37-1 are 
also applicable against the respondent in this case. 
That statute is widely recognized as the "One Action 
Rule" of the State of Utah, and provides that there shall 
be one action for the foreclosure of any mortgage or 
·Trust Ile.~d secured solely by mortgage or trust deed on 
real property. As set forth above, the special administrator 
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of the estate of Walker Bank & Trust Company specifically 
petitioned the court for authority to pay all past due 
current and future payments on the trust deed note which 
is the subject of respondents counterclaim. In said 
petition, the special administrator admitted that the 
appellant in this case claimed to be the fee title owner 
of the subject property. In the same hearing where the 
court approved the payment of all past due, present, and 
future payments due on the trust deed note, from the 
assets of the estate of Utahna Petty Belnap, the special 
administrator concurrently disclaimed any interest in 
the propertya At that point, it is clear that the 
special admini$trator knew on behalf of itself and as 
the administrator of the estate that its security had 
been impair~d, and with the authority of the court to 
continue making the payments on the note from the assets 
of the estate until further order of the court, should 
indeed have filed its claims against the estate as 
provided by law, and receive the payments from the estate 
until its trust deed note was satisfied in full. In the 
case of Baker National Bank v. Henderson (Montana) 445 
Pacific 2d 574, the Montana court held pursuant with 
applicable Montana statutes that the failure of the bank 
to file its creditors claim against the estate of a 
decedent within a statutory period had the effect of 
barring the claim, and not only was the remedy itself 
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destroyed, but the right was wiped out, and the claim . 
thereupon ceased to existc 
It may be asserted. on the 
other hand that Walker Bank & Trust Company in its 
petition for approval to make payments on the Trust 
Deed note did in fact make a claim against the estate. 
In that respect, since the court granted their pet~tion, 
and directed that payments be continued to be made on 
the trust deed note until further order of the court, 
and further since no order of the court was ever entered 
denying them the right to make the payments, that Walker 
Bank & Trust Company cannot now assert a lien against 
this property where they had the authority to satisfy 
their note from the assets of the estate. If they did 
in fact file such a claim by virtue of the filing of the 
petition for approval to make payments, then they have 
commenced an action against the estate of Utahna Petty 
Belnap and they are precluded from bringing any other 
action on the trust deed. 
The provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 78-
37-1 et seq., clearly provide that a secured creditor, 
upon determining that his security has been impaired 
can in fact waive his security and proceed against the 
general assets of the debtor. Since the estate of Utahna 
Petty Belnap has disclaimed any interest in the subject 
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property, and since such disclai~er would obviously 
result in the impairment of the security, the petition 
of Walker Bank & Trust Company as the special administrator 
for payment on the note from the general assets of the 
estate is clearly the action·contemplated by Utah 
Code Annotated Section 78-37-1. 
It may be argued that the provisions of Utah 
Code Annotated Section 75-3-803 (3) exempts respondent 
from necessarily filing a claim as a creditor of the 
estate of Utahna Petty Belnap since it clai~s a mortgage 
or othei;- lien upon "property of the estateo 11 Since it 
is now a matter of a judicial order and decree that the 
subject property is not the property of Utahma Petty 
Belnap, such a claimed exemption would failo 
In addition to the foregoing principals of 
estopple, and the provision of the mortgage foreclosure 
statutes of the State of Utah, it should also be clear 
that the determination of the Third District Court in 
the matter of the probate of the estate of Utahna Petty 
Belnap .as well as the dismissal with prejudice of the 
counterclaim of Walker Bank & Trust Company, in the 
instant case constitutes a total bar to any further 
action by Walker Bank & Trust Company on the principals 
of res judic~ta; see Con v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 
342 Pacific 2d page 7L Such a doctrine applies to all 
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persons who may be affected by judgments rendered in 
the probate matter and in this case. Since these 
matters were consolidated by the Honorable Judge Hall, it 
is clear that Walker Bank & Trust Company in its cor-
porate capacity, as well as any other capacity was a 
party both to this action and to the estate action. 
In the final analysis, it seems that the District 
Court has rendered a judgment in favor of Walker Bank & 
Trust Company declaring that it has a good and valid 
lien against real property situated in Salt Lake County, 
but the judgments of the Third District Court in this 
case, as well as the probate case would lead us but to 
one cortclusion, to wit: That appellant in this· case 
has no interest in the subject property, and decedent 
in the probate case has no interest in the subject pro-
perty. In deed, if no one ~as any interest in the 
su~ject property how is the respondent able to assert 
a claim based upon a trust deed note executed by one of 
the parties who claims no interest in the property. 
POINT III. CAN THE RESPONDENT, WALKER BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, BASE A CLAIM TO A SECURITY INTEREST IN REAL 
PROPERTY UPON AN INSTRUMENT WHICH IS ADMITTEDLY AND 
FACTUALLY FORGED. 
It is undisputed that the signature of appellant's 
mother on the deed dated November 10, 1952, is in fact 
forged (Record Memorandum Decision page 540) , and that 
the signature of appellant's father on said deed is 
factually in dispute (Record pp. 14 and 15). 
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The law in the State of Utah with respect to a 
forged instrument is clearly set forth in the case of 
Rasmussen vs. Olson, 583 Pacif.ic 2d 50, (Utah 1978) ., 
The Rasmussen case clearly held that the recording of 
a forged deed gives no ~otice to the world or to any-
body within in it of the contents thereof that such a 
deed is void and even a bona fide purchaser from the 
person who offered it takes nothing by it. 
In the case of Mosley vs. Magnolia Petroleum 
Company, 45 New Mexico 230, 114 Pacific 2d 740, (1941) 
the law with respect to forged instruments is exhaustively 
treated and the Rasmussen case cites Mosley with 
approval., In the Mosley case, it was factually shown 
that one of the p~rties had fraudulently and surreptiously 
obtained a deed from an escrow agent without the knowledge 
or consent of the granter of the deed, and after obtaining 
~he same, altered the instrument with respect to the 
nama of the grantee and delivered it to the newly named 
grantee., The Mosley court held that where the instrument 
had been altered in that singular respect and further 
because of the fact that there had been no delivery by 
the original granter to the grantee named in the altered 
instrument, that the deed,was void and that no bona fide 
purchaser could rely upon tr.e same in a claim for title. 
Here, ~he deed of November 10, 1952, a deed upon 
which the respondent apparently relied is not only void 
because of the signature of Ida Belnap, but also because 
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the same was never delivered by the purported ~ranter, 
Henry Belnap to the purported grantee, Utahna P. Belnap. 
(Record ppo 14-15) o 
In the case of Salazar v. Manderfield 134 Pacific 
2d, 544 (New Mexico 1943) , it was held that a deed 
which is void in part because of a fraud with respect 
to any single material aspect thereof will be void as to 
the whole. Appellants respectfully submits that the 
Salazar case taken in connection with the Rasmussen 
opinion (583 Pacific 2d 50)-and the Maqnolia opinion 
(114 Pacific 2d 740) is 0 the better law and the fact that 
the instrument dated November 10, 1952 is an admitted 
forgery, that the same is void, conveys no title, and 
puts no one on notice of any interest contained therein. 
Appellent cites the case of Walker Ban1<: & Trust, 
Company v. Thorup, 7 Utah 2d 33, 317 Pacific 2d 952 
(1957) in support of the assertion that Walker Bank & 
Trust Company having both instruments in its possession 
at the time of the recording of the instrument which is 
admittedly forged, is charged with, the responsibility to 
know and determine the validity of all aspects of the 
instrument upon which it intends to rely. In the Walker 
Bank v. Thorup case the attorney who claimed to have 
witnessed the signing of the questioned deeds, and to have 
taken the decedent's acknowledgement testified in1great 
detail . There was also testimony to the effect that the 
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deceased had often stated after the date of the deed 
that the deceased had given the respective tracts of 
land to the respective defendants in the caseo The 
court ruled.however that there was nothing in the 
testimony that would support a finding that the sign-
ature, although written by another was ever authorized 
by the decedent or that the decedent ever adopted it 
as her own, Thus, in spite of the fact that the 
decedent may have acted in such a way as to give 
credence to the validity of the deed, since the same 
were forged they had no force or effect, Walker Bank 
Vo Thoruo (supra at page 954). 
This law is particularly applicable to appellants 
caseo Since there is no testimony whatsoever suggesting 
that the deceased mother of appellant ever adopted or 
ratified the forged signature, but on the contrary, there 
is testimony of Henry Belnap that he never signed his 
wifes name to the instrument irr question, and that he 
never appeared before the purported notary of his 
signature and the forged signature of Ida Belnap, thus 
making it impossible under the statutes of this State 
for said ipstrument to be recorded or recordableo 
(Record pp. 14 and 15). 
It should also be noted that appellant's mother 
had been deceased for more than one year when t~e forged 
deed dated November 10, 1952 was delivered to Walker 
Bank as a "new deed" (Record pp. 531), when the.deed of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 24 
August of 1951 was already in the possession of Walker 
Bank & Trust Company, (Record pp. 80-83). Thus Walker 
Bank had actual notice of the ownership interest of the 
appellant at all times prior to recording the forged 
deed in derogation of appellant's ownership, and this 
notice continued until after the filing ?f this action 
',\hen both orig·inal documents were discovered in the 
files of Walker Bank & Trust Company. (Deposition of 
Stephen L. Goalen Record pp. 769 (Deposition ~~. 9 and 
10) . Since the initial deed which appellant had delivered 
to Walker Bank was in their file and constituted actual 
notice to them of the claimed interest which appellant 
had in the property, the bank was charged with the duty 
and responsibility to inquire into the validity of the 
second deed. 
In the case of Oailvie vs. Idaho Bank & Trust 
Company, 582 Pacific 2d 215 (Idaho 1978) the court held 
under the facts of that case that tl1ough the bank could 
have protected itself from a forgery, it did not take the 
care to do so; and that- the' bank cannot assert the 
rights of a bona fide purchaser. 
All of t~ese facts taken together with the fact 
that Walker Bank & Trust Company as a special administrator 
of the estate of Utahna Petty Belnap disclaimed any in-
terest in the subject property should clearly establish 
that the opinion and judgment of the Third District court 
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majority opinion with respect to forged instrumentsa 
In further support of appellant's contention 
with respect to this matter, appellant cites the case 
of Coast Mutual Buildina & Loan Association v. Security 
Title Insurance and Guarantee CompallY..L.. 14 Cal. App. 2d 
225, 57 Pacific 2d 1392 (1936). In that case, the Cali-
fornia Court found itself facing a situat~~n very 
similar to the facts in this case. Therethe Court 
held that where a party forged the owner's signature 
to a deed and then obtained a loan which was secured 
by a Trust Deed on the property, the actual owner 
should prevail in a subsequent action to quiet title 
to such property. The District Court of Appeal 
affirmed the lower court decision t~at the insurer 
of a title policy, which policy had been issued to 
the lenders simultaneously with the recordation of the 
forged deed and the Trust Deed, could not defeat the 
lender's action on the policy on the ground that the 
owner's rights were not "shown by public records" 
as provided in the policy. In that lower court decision, 
the California court held that the owner of the property 
should prevail against the encumberancer of the property 
who took such encumbrance as a result of a forged deed 
even though such forged deed was properly recorded. 
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Finally, since the first deed dated August 23, 
1951, was duly executed and delivered (Record, pp. 14-15), 
the second deed conveyed nothing, the fee having already 
been delivered to appellant and accepted by him. Delivery 
and acceptance of a deed irrevocably passes title out 
of the granter, and he cannot by any act subsequent 
to the delivery invalidate, alter, or affect the first 
conveyance, Valley State Bank v. Dean, 97 Colo. 151, 
47 P. 2d 924 .. (1934) 
CONCLUSION 
The Third District· Court, through the Declaratory 
Judgment of Judge Bryant Croft has ignored the basic 
rules of pleadings and the statute respecting declaratory 
judgments. Indeed it seems to have created a paradox. 
The Honorable Judge Gordon Hal~ has entered two consistent 
orders to the effect that appellant is the owner of the 
property and the estate of appellant'-s deceased wife had no 
interest (Record, pp 390-91; Record, pp 713-715). The 
judgment of Judge Bryant Croft, on the contrary says that 
appellant's deceased wife has a good and yalid first lien 
against the property (Record pp 550-555) This is in 
spite of the fact that the counterclaim of Walker Ban~ & 
Trust aE Special Administrator, which alleged _a chain of 
title, was dismissed with prejudice; and the counterclaim 
of Walker Bank & Trust in its corporate capacity, which 
has not set up a chain of title or joined anv recessary 
party, was allowed. 
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Since the judgment of Judge Croft is inconsistent 
with earlier rulings of the same court; since Respondent 
has alleged no chain of title; since Respondant has joined 
no party claiming an interest (the judgment ruled 
that appellant had no interest and Respondant denied 
appellants had an interest); and last of all, since the 
only recorded deed is forged and conveys nothing, it is 
mandatory that the Judgment be' reversed and judgment 
entered in favor of Appellant quieting title as aginst 
the Respondent; or at least that the matter be remanded 
for trial to determine the proper root of titlec 
Respectfully submitted 
Kenneth L. Rothey 
Attorney for Appellant 
2275 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
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